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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

t

CURTIS L. JONES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890015-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of second degree felony
burglary and second degree felony theft in the Second District
Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish

defendant's guilt of burglary and theft?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Burglary - (1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit
an assault on any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
Theft - Elements - A person commits theft if
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with second degree felony
burglary and second felony degree theft.

Defendant was convicted

in a jury trial on November 14, 1988. Judge Roth sentenced
defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less than
one year and not more than fifteen years for each charge.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 9, 1988, around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., Thea Olson
was awakened by her neighbor's dog.
about fifteen to twenty minutes.

The dog had been barking for

Ms. Olson went to see her

neighbor, Mike Jenkins, to have him quiet the dog (R. 36). When
she arrived at Mr. Jenkins' house, she noticed the front door was
open.

Ms. Olson also saw two people crouched under a tree.

She

asked if it was Mike, and started toward the tree (R. 37). Both
men took off running and one ran into her, knocking her over.
However, she was able to get a good look at him because the porch
lights and kitchen lights were on (R. 43-44).

She began chasing

defendant, but then ran back to get her car.

She drove down the

alley and saw one person jump the fence.

The other man, the one

who bumped into her, ran back to his vehicle (R. 41-42).
Ms. Olson drove back to her house and told her
roommate, Carrie Bell, to get in the vehicle.

Ms. Bell had

noticed a Nissan pick-up pull out, so they followed it (R. 63).
While they were following the Nissan, defendant turned his head
and Ms. Olson got another look at him (R. 43). Ms. Bell also got
a look at defendant, describing him as having scars or acne and a
thin face (R. 64). Ms. Olson had her high beams on and Ms. Bell
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wrote down the sticker number of the vehicle, which was later
discovered to be owned by defendant's girlfriend (R. 65, 71).
Ms. Olson then discontinued the chase.
After they returned, the police showed Ms. Olson three
pictures of suspects.

Ms. Olson picked defendant's picture as

the person she chased (R. 51). A few weeks later, Ms. Olson was
shown four different photos of suspects and she again picked
defendant (R. 72-75).

Also, at the trial, she identified

defendant as the person who bumped into her (R. 60).
Defendant claimed at trial he was not at the scene of
the crime because his parole officer saw him at his home about
8:30 that night and that he loaned the truck to Galveston Scott
(R. 70). However, when the police questioned defendant, he could
not explain where he was that night (R. 70).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was positively identified three times by Ms.
Olson and he fits Ms. Bell's description of the suspect.

The

Nissan pick-up, seen leaving the crime, is registered to
defendant's girlfriend.

Also, it was possible for defendant to

drive to Mr. Jenkins' house in time to commit the crimes and
there is circumstantial evidence he actually committed the crime.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of
burglary and theft.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY AND THEFT.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a high standard
of appellate review when the issue is sufficiency of the
evidence.

The Court will interfere only when "reasonable men

could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt."

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987)

quoting State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

However,

the Court accords great deference to the jury verdict because it
is "the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and
determine the credibility of the witnesses."

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d

at 412. All the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to the
jury verdict.

State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App.

1989), citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
Therefore, defendant has the burden of establishing the evidence
"was so inconclusive or insubstantial as to preclude the jury
from properly finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988).

State v.

However, the Court will

not reverse the verdict as long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, supporting the elements of the
crime.

Walker, 765 P.2d at U74, quoting State v. Booker, 709

P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
The statutory requirements of burglary and theft are:
Burglary — (1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
-4-

in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
Theft — Elements — A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with the
purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 76-6-404 (1978).
As defendant concedes, there is no question a burglary
and theft occurred at Mike Jenkins' home on August 9, 1988. The
issue before the jury, and now on appeal, is simply
identification of the perpetrator.
Defendant contends "the jury convicted him on no
substantial evidence that he in fact committed the crime . . .
because of the faulty identification and evidence discrediting
that identification . . . ." (Br. of App. at 15). A review of
the substantial evidence placed before the jury reveals
defendant's claim is without merit.
Ms. Olson (neighbor of the burglary/theft victim)
positively identified defendant in a photo line-up at the scene
of the crime and at the police station.

Ms. Olson also

identified defendant at the trial. Ms. Olson's testimony was
corroborated by Ms. Bell's description of the suspect.
Ms. Olson testified that on August 9, 1988, she was
awakened by Mr. Jenkins' dog (R. 36). When she went over to her
neighbor's house, she noticed the front door was open.
saw two people crouched under a tree (R. 38-39).
approached them, both took off running.

She also

When she

Ms. Olson got a good

look at one man because he ran right into her (R. 56). Ms. Olson
followed the defendant on foot and later in her vehicle with her
-5-

roommate, Ms. Bell.

While she was following defendant in her

vehicle, he turned his head and she got another look at him (R.
43).

Ms. Bell copied down the sticker number to the Nissan and

then Ms. Olson turned around (R. 49).
When Ms. Olson arrived back at the scene, the police
showed her three suspects' pictures.

Ms. Olson picked

defendant's picture as the person she saw (R. 51). A few weeks
later, at the police station, Ms. Olson was shown four photos and
again picked defendant as the person who bumped into her (R. 7274).

Furthermore, at the trial, Ms. Olson claimed defendant was

"definitely the person at the scene." (R. 60).
Although Ms. Bell testified she could not identify
defendant, she described the suspect as having acne or scars and
a thin fact (R. 64). Defendant fits this description.
Furthermore, the Nissan pick-up Ms. Olson and Ms. Bell followed
is owned by defendant's girlfriend (R. 71). The evidence
presented would lead a reasonable person to believe, beryond a
reasonable doubt, defendant was the man who bumped into Ms.
Olson.
Evidence was also presented which could lead the jury
to infer defendant actually committed the crime.

Mr. Jenkins was

not home and his front door was wide open and there were two
people crouched under a tree (R. 36, 38). Ms. Olson identified
defendant as the person she saw stooped under the tree.
suspects ran away when she approached them.

The two

The unidentified

partner was carrying something under his arm and three white bags
(R. 47). Defendant started off carrying two white bags but
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dropped them in the driveway (R. 48). Furthermore, Mr. Jenkins'
side door was broken and his stereo equipment had been stolen (R.
91).

The circumstantial evidence presented would lead a jury to

reasonably infer defendant committed the burglary and theft.
Defendant claims the evidence he presented discredits
the identification.

First, defendant claims he loaned his truck

to Galveston Scott for the evening and, thus, was not involved in
the crime.

Second, defendant argues his parole officer saw him

at 8:36, thus, it would be impossible for him to be at Mr.
Jenkins' home at the time the crime was committed.
"It is the jury's duty to resolve all questions
regarding the reliability of the testimony . . . ."
P.2d at 874-75.

Walker, 765

The Court "must accept the version of facts

which supports the judgment" when presented with conflicting
evidence.

State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d

392, 394 (Utah 1987) citing State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556
(Utah 1985).

The jury believed the facts presented by the State

that defendant was involved in the crime.
thought defendant's claim was reliable.

The jury must not have

Thus, the Court should

accept the version of facts which supports the verdict, even
though defendant claims there is conflicting evidence.
In addition, it is not impossible for defendant to have
been at Mr. Jenkins' home the night of the crime.
parole officer observed him at home at 8:36.

Defendant's

However, had the

parole officer testified, he would have said he doubled back by
defendant's home and defendant was gone (R. 102).
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Ms. Olson testified she was awakened about 9:00 or 9:30
(R. 36). The dog had been barking about fifteen to twenty
minutes (R. 36). Thus, the crime would have been committed
anywhere between 8:40 and 9:15.
It is about a twenty minute drive from defendant's
house to Mr. Jenkins' house (R. 81). If defendant left right
after his parole officer, he would have arrived at Mr. Jenkins'
home at 9:00.
the robbery.

Thus, he would have had plenty of time to commit
Given this time span, a jury could reasonably

believe it was possible for defendant to commit the crime even
without having heard the testimony of the parole officer.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the jury could believe,
beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant committed the burglary and
theft.

Thus, the state requests this Court to affirm defendant's

conviction.
DATED this

day of June, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

ey General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Bernard L. Allen, Public Defender Assoc, attorney for
appellant, 2568 Washington Blvd. Ogden, Utah 84401, this
of June, 1989.
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